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I.  INTRODUCTION* 
Macroeconomic stability is a necessary condition for development and for growth. 
However, the record of the past two decades shows that recently fashionable ideas, 
and policy recommendations, of what makes for good macroeconomic management 
and for such stability have been overly narrow. Indeed, in many countries they have 
wrought the opposite of what was intended.  
Developments over the past decade have changed perceptions across the world about 
the nature of desirable macroeconomic policies. The Asian financial crisis of the late 
1990s and the meltdown in Argentina at the turn of the decade showed the possibility 
of apparently “prudent” fiscal strategies still being associated with unsustainable 
macroeconomic processes that created the possibilities of crises. The emphasis placed 
explicitly by the UN and the international community on achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals and the need to ensure finance for development have indicated 
the need for changing the emphasis of economic strategies. All these and related 
factors have produced a broad understanding that macroeconomic management in 
open developing economies should be guided by the following framework: 
•  Macroeconomic policy needs to be developed within a co-ordinated 
framework, so that fiscal, monetary, exchange rate and capital management 
policies are consistent.  
•  The time horizon should be medium term, set within a systematic framework 
that provides the contours within which macroeconomic and public 
expenditure strategies are organised.  
•  Economic growth, livelihood stability and employment generation must be 
given significance, and should not be “crowded out” by an  overly narrow 
focus on macroeconomic stability and inflation control.  
•  It is not just the aggregate rate of economic growth, but also the pattern of that 
growth, which is crucial. Indeed, a moderate but sustainable rate of growth, 
which involves employment generation and poverty reduction, is preferable to 
a higher rate of growth that is based on greater income inequalities and has 
more potential for volatility and crisis.  
•  For most countries, the primary goal should be productive employment 
generation providing “decent work”. This requires more than macroeconomic 
policy alone; in particular, industrial policies providing carefully considered 
incentives to promote desired investment and financial policies including 
directed credit will play a role.  
•  The significance of public expenditure in sustaining and expanding the 
productive human resource base of the country through social spending must 
be recognised. Macroeconomic policies must ensure that public expenditure in 
the social sectors is maintained at adequate levels.  
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•  Developing country governments need to be more confident of the positive 
effects of appropriate expansionary fiscal policy and, in particular, of the 
critical role of public investment. 
•  There needs to be more emphasis on raising public resources in ways that do 
not adversely affect the poor, for example through effective implementation of 
progressive direct taxation, (flexible) trade taxes and taxes on capital 
movements. 
•  Monetary policy should accommodate fiscal policy, not the other way around, 
and both should be targeted to real economic goals such as employment 
generation, livelihood protection and expansion and poverty reduction. This 
has implications for the kind of independence to be given to central banks. It 
also means that inflation targeting,  in itself, cannot be the central goal of 
monetary policy.  
•  Exchange rates should be flexibly managed, even to the point of creating a 
band within which market forces are allowed to work. This requires some 
control over capital account movements, preferably through a range of flexible 
instruments.  
•  Last, but not least, all macroeconomic policies must take full account of equity 
considerations and impacts. 
In short, pragmatism, within a growth-enhancing framework, and flexibility, guided 
by the specific requirements of each country’s context, should be the guiding 
principles, rather than a dogmatic “one size fits all” approach.  
The following material expands on the above points. We do not propose any specific 
policies as it would be impossible to do so given the differences between developing 
countries. Instead, we raise some major issues for consideration and  suggest the 
policy space that is available to address them. We begin with placing macroeconomic 
policy in context in the following section, and then consider fiscal policy, monetary 
policy, managing economic cycles, and exchange rate policy in the next four sections.  
II.  WHAT IS MACROECONOMIC POLICY? 
Macroeconomic policy addresses the overall aggregates of the economy: prices, 
output, employment, investment and savings, government balances, and balances on 
the external account.  
The goals of macroeconomic policy can and do vary. They include creating conditions 
for sustained growth; price stabilisation or inflation control; reducing unemployment; 
smoothing economic cycles and volatility in output and employment; correcting 
aggregate and sectoral imbalances; reducing poverty, and providing greater equity for 
all, especially the marginalised. 
There are three major policy instruments to manage these macroeconomic aggregates, 
namely,  
(a) fiscal policy;  
(b) monetary policy, and  
(c) exchange rate policy.    7 
Fiscal policy covers matters such as taxation and other methods of resource 
mobilisation, and levels and patterns of expenditure, that is, the aggregate fiscal 
stance. Monetary policy centrally addresses the base interest rate and levels of credit 
in the economy. Exchange rate policy, in contemporary open economies, is largely 
related to monetary policy. 
Macroeconomic policy involves trade-offs between its conventionally accepted goals. 
Thus, a quest for macroeconomic stability focusing on inflation control may imply 
sacrificing employment, and counter-cyclical measures may worsen sectoral 
imbalances. 
These short run goals in turn have a bearing on development policies. The quest for 
macroeconomic stability may lead to insufficient emphasis, or worse, on strategies for 
sustainable and more inclusive development, or improving human development and 
meeting broader social objectives. In particular, the goals of price stability and 
employment generation can be in conflict. Unfortunately, the pursuit of price stability 
or the correction of external imbalances has too often become so dominant as to lead 
to the neglect of pervasive and persistent unemployment and underemployment. 
However, a shift in focus making productive employment generation the most 
important goal need not generate imbalances or instability. 
Short-term and long-term linkages 
Economic policy makers have often assumed that macroeconomic policies are short 
run measures to address current problems, most importantly stabilisation and 
correcting aggregate imbalances, and that they can be treated separately from 
measures to promote economic growth and development. However, short-term 
measures can determine the contours of future growth and affect possible future 
economic strategies. For example, a non-judicious reduction in public expenditure to 
correct a fiscal deficit, resulting in a reduction in important infrastructure investment, 
directly affects future growth prospects. Conversely, policies such as development 
plans or economic adjustment exercises designed for the medium or longer term 
directly impact upon current conditions and affect short run movements. Policies of 
trade liberalisation designed to reduce external deficits by bringing domestic relative 
prices closer in line with world trade prices may create incentives to reduce 
investment and increase consumption, thereby creating imbalances within the 
economy; or they may reduce trade tax revenue, creating pressure on the public 
deficit.  
Short run macroeconomic policy and longer term growth strategies are inextricably 
linked, not separate and independent. In particular, public investment affects growth 
directly, by improving the supply conditions of infrastructure, etc., thereby expanding 
the capital base of the economy and the potential for further accumulation, and 
indirectly, through its positive linkage effects with private investment. For developing 
countries, the paramount concern is to access a more growth-oriented, employment-
generating macroeconomic stance, and public investment is a critical factor in 
achieving this. However, it should also be recognised that macroeconomic policies are 
not the only factor determining the rate and pattern of growth, and that the investment 
climate in general (including for both public and private investment) has a significant 
role to play. Microeconomic interventions and other policies can influence the 
incentives to invest and the distribution of investment in important ways.    8 
In addition to growth associated with productive employment generation, a major 
concern of macroeconomic policy is the reduction of economic volatility. Economic 
instability is undesirable for many reasons. There are direct costs of income 
variability in the presence of imperfect capital and insurance markets, so that income 
smoothing over the economic cycle is imperfect and downswings are associated with 
consumption falls especially among the poor. In general, in all countries, the poor 
bear the brunt of economic fluctuations: they suffer most in slumps, through higher 
unemployment and lower real wages; and they tend to gain relatively less from booms 
which, especially in recent times, have been more associated with higher returns to 
capital and not necessarily with higher employment generation.   
Politics of policy choices 
Given the potential conflicts between goals and across instruments, the choice of 
policy mix is not a purely technocratic exercise, but reflects political choices and has 
social implications. Aggregate policies carry strong distributional implications, 
especially with respect to asset and income distribution and the differential provision 
of public goods and services across groups in the population. These implications 
relate not only to differences across economic classes and social groups, but also 
gender differences.   
Some examples may help to clarify this point. Controlling inflation can be seen as a 
goal in itself, because it hurts bondholders and those who receive interest income, or 
because it hurts those whose wage incomes are not indexed. But it may also be seen 
as a means to faster growth (on the grounds that inflation creates uncertainties about 
the future and therefore depresses investment) or more equitable distribution (because 
inflation adversely affects the non-indexed and poorer wage earners). However, in 
some cases an excessive focus on inflation control may be worse for the poor than 
moderate inflation, if the inflation control measures create higher unemployment and 
therefore directly causes poverty. It could also weaken workers’ bargaining position, 
depress wages and therefore indirectly increase poverty.  
Similarly, cutting government expenditure and raising the price of public services in 
order to reduce the fiscal deficit may be preferred by those holding financial assets, 
but would operate against those who rely on the multiplier effects of government 
spending for their incomes, and add to the burden of unpaid household labour thereby 
disproportionately hurting women. Monetary policies can have different effects upon 
groups who can access credit markets easily, and those (such as the poor and women) 
who have less control over assets and therefore collateral, and so cannot access credit 
on equal terms. In all these cases, the growth and distributional effects will vary 
depending upon the characteristics of the country concerned, such as the degree of 
indexation of wage incomes, how investors respond, the particular activities in which 
employment is generated or lost, and so on.  
Therefore policy-makers and the general public need to be aware of the trade-offs and 
the distributional consequences of particular policies, so that informed political 
choices shape the development strategies and the macroeconomic policies chosen in 
particular contexts. 
In brief, economic policy making – especially macroeconomic policy – is not only 
about the total aggregates in the economy. It is also about income distribution, and the 
gains and losses by gender as well as to different classes and groups in society.    9 
Another important point to bear in mind is the importance of microeconomic 
instruments for meeting macroeconomic objectives.  Macroeconomic processes are 
not entirely the consequences of what are seen conventionally as the basic 
macroeconomic instruments. Particular micro interventions can have important 
macroeconomic and developmental effects, both positive and negative. Bank 
regulations can have macroeconomic consequences for domestic financial and 
business cycles as well as for the balance of payments. Directed credit can change 
sectoral balances and thereby affect aggregate growth and its pattern. Tax and other 
policies that discourage destabilising and speculative capital flows can prevent 
macroeconomic volatility. Competition policies that affect domestic investors and 
their interaction with foreign competition can affect the level of investment and the 
balance of payments.   
III.  FISCAL POLICIES 
Fiscal policies relate to the set of government strategies for revenue collection and 
expenditure, and they play a critical role in determining both the level and the pattern 
of economic activity. They affect growth prospects as well as income distribution in 
important ways. The means by which public resources are mobilised, and the extent to 
which they are increased, affects the incomes of different sections of the society and 
the ability of the government to spend. The pattern of government expenditure 
directly affects the potential for future economic expansion because of the critical role 
of public investment in infrastructure, for example, but it also affects the material and 
social conditions of society. The overall fiscal stance can determine the level of 
activity and employment and the degree of vulnerability to economic cycles.  
It is important for any fiscal strategy to be sustainable over the medium term, which 
means that it should not involve explosive accrual of public debt or lead to excessive 
public deficits that generate major aggregate imbalances over time. Therefore, there is 
clearly a need for fiscal discipline to be exercised within a medium term time horizon. 
However, in the short term and in each and every period, this is not always required. 
Indeed, an obsession with meeting rigid fiscal targets in each period may be counter-
productive if it implies lowering the growth and employment generation potential of 
the economy and not utilising domestic resources effectively. This is discussed in 
more detail below. The feasible and desirable extent of flexibility in fiscal stance will 
depend on the specific context of the developing country, bearing in mind the broader 
necessity of fiscal discipline over a specified time period.  
Public resource mobilisation 
The importance of increasing public revenues in most developing countries cannot be 
stressed too much. Given the significance of public investment in enhancing 
economic gro wth and meeting other social goals, and the need for fiscal sustainability, 
it is absolutely critical for governments to focus on methods of raising revenues. 
International evidence suggests that those states with some degree of success in 
economic development are also those that have been able to increase or maintain high 
rates of public resource mobilisation. 
In many developing countries, the need to increase public resources is especially 
marked at present, because government revenues have been under pressure, and have 
even decreased as a proportion of national income. This is not only because of the 
decline in ODA and the uncertain and often volatile nature of external capital flows,   10 
but because macroeconomic and trade policies of the recent past have tended to 
reduce revenue from taxation in many low-income countries.  
Some of the ways in which recent policies have reduced public tax revenues in 
relation to national incomes are as follows. Many countries offer incentives to foreign 
investors in the form of tax breaks and explicit or implicit subsidies, in order to attract 
foreign capital into the economy. When there is a demand for a “level playing field” 
for domestic investors, they are forced to reduce taxes on domestic profits as well, 
and both of these reduce tax revenues. Trade liberalization has tended to involve 
extensive cuts in import tariffs as well as export taxes, thereby reducing an important 
source of indirect taxation. Once again, for reasons of symmetry, domestic excise 
duties cannot be raised in consequence. The shift to a VAT regime in many countries 
has been accompanied by the reduction or elimination of other indirect taxes, with a 
net reduction of tax revenues. In addition, cuts in government expenditure as part of 
fiscal restraint packages tend to make output growth more sluggish, which in turn 
tends to negatively affect tax collections even at given tax rates. For all these reasons, 
tax revenues as a share of GDP have been on the decline in developing countries as a 
group.  
Globalisation has undoubtedly played a role in this, through both trade and financial 
liberalization. Greater openness to capital flows and concern with attracting such 
inflows and avoiding capital flight have entailed major tax concessions to both 
foreign and domestic investors. This has been compounded by the presence of 
international tax havens and the flexibilities allowed by double taxation treaties and 
other loopholes in tax systems, which effectively allow for large scale tax evasion. As 
a result, the tax losses of developing countries, because of assets held offshore and the 
shifting of corporate profits between jurisdictions, have been estimated to be as much 
as $100 billion per annum (Cobham, 2005).  
Obviously, only co-ordinated international action can plug  such tax loopholes for 
capital. This should be a priority on the international policy agenda, but it is not yet 
so, even though it would provide much greater revenue raising capacity to developing 
countries as well as have positive income distribution effects. However, there are 
other possible instruments that can be used by individual countries, many of them 
with the advantage of relative ease of collection. 
   11 
Strengthening domestic tax policy 
Domestic tax policies can clearly be strengthened in most developing countries, in 
terms of direct taxation as well as certain types of transactions taxes that do not fall 
disproportionately upon the poor.  
Tax policies have direct income distribution implications – across classes, regions, 
social groups and gender – and these implications must be borne in mind while 
formulating appropriate policies. In particular, the gender effects of tax policies are 
often ignored, even as there is greater recognition of the gender-differentiated effects 
of public expenditure policies. Barnett and Grown (2003) have provided indications 
Box 1   
The advantages and disadvantages of VAT 
Many countries have recently shifted from sales taxes to  VAT (Value Added Tax) systems. 
Despite its name, the VAT is not generally a tax on value added as such; rather, it is usually a 
tax on consumption. In essence, VAT is charged at all stages of production or sale, but with 
some mechanism for firms to offset the tax they paid on their purchases of goods and services 
against the tax they charge on their sales of goods and services.  
The arguments in favour of VAT relate to the perception that it leads to greater harmonisation 
and creates more incentives to pay the taxes. It is also argued that VAT is a non-distorting tax.  
VAT systems can have different rates, but they are often harmonised and may even carry a 
single rate. This can make it more regressive than pure sales taxes. A uniform VAT is 
regressive as it increases the cost of goods consumed by the poor. However, exemptions 
increase cascading effects and break the VAT chain, making enforcement more difficult (Bird 
and Gendron, 2006). Differential rates also create administrative problems. 
Over 120 countries currently use some form of VAT system. The evidence on its fiscal and 
distributive implications is very mixed. As VAT is supposed to be a tax to end all taxes, many 
countries that have adopted VAT do not levy excise duty, entry tax or luxury tax. This can 
lead to a decline in tax revenue if VAT receipts do not offset the loss of other tax revenues. An 
IMF study found that in low income countries, VAT has replaced less than 30 per cent of the 
revenues lost through the elimination of trade taxes (Baunsgaard and Keen, 2005).  
There are other problems with implementing VAT in developing countries, especially those 
with a large informal sector or “black economy” (Stiglitz and Emran, 2004). VAT is 
essentially a tax on the formal sector. It cannot cover informal activities, such as small-scale 
farming and household enterprises, small vendors and petty traders or service providers. In a 
perverse way, VAT can impede development by encouraging such activities to stay informal, 
rather than enter the formal sector where there is more value addition. In response, 
governments may try to increase taxation of the formal sector, which in turn can drive more 
activity into the informal sector. This is all the more likely as, in many developing countries, 
individuals and enterprises at all income levels are in the informal sector to varying extents. 
Thus, in developing countries, VAT may not be as “non-distorting” as claimed. If the informal 
sector is large, it is more distorting, as it creates a disincentive to transit to formal or 
registered economic activities, despite the desire of governments to expand the latter.  
In any case, it is practically impossible in almost all developing countries to impose a tax on 
all commodities and services. For even partial coverage, VAT requires substantial 
administrative capacity and has relatively high costs of enforcement. VAT refunds are often 
cumbersome and expensive to administer. This is why moving from other taxes to VAT 
typically reduces tax revenues for small open developing countries, in particular. In large 
developing countries with federal systems of government and taxation, there are other issues, 
such as the sharing of powers of taxation on consumption between regional and central 
government, which can create complex issues for the management of tax policy.    12 
of the many ways in which different tax policies can have differential impacts on men 
and women, and also therefore also have different revenue implications.  
The desirable tax regimes for developing countries, that would provide increased 
collection without disproportionately harming the poor or women and having 
regressive effects, would imply: 
•  Improving tax administration and enforcement by making available more 
public resources for such activities, and by reducing or eliminating 
exemptions and loopholes. 
•  Diversifying sources of tax revenue instead of relying on a single indirect tax 
such as VAT. 
•  Relying as far as possible on rule-based and non-discretionary tax instruments 
which are corruption-resistant and have lower transaction costs. 
•  Increasing personal income tax collection from the rich. 
•  Targeting luxury consumption in raising taxes. 
•  Taxing capital more effectively without affecting investment. 
•  Using trade taxes creatively and flexibly. 
How to go about each of these is discussed in more detail below.  
There is a strong case for increasing the share of personal income tax in total revenue 
– not  necessarily by raising marginal tax rates but by stepping up enforcement and 
eliminating loopholes. 
Improving tax policy and tax collection should entail diversifying sources of revenue 
and moving beyond heavy reliance on the value-added tax. Governments, even in 
poor countries, have to be willing to spend more on tax administration and come 
down more clearly for enforcement and against evasion. 
Taxes on capital and foreign trade are not only easier to collect, they are also less 
regressive than indirect taxes that affect the incomes of the poor. The increasing 
reliance on domestic indirect taxes of various kinds in budgets of developing country 
governments generally adds to income inequalities. Even payroll taxes have been 
found to be regressive in many developing countries. Therefore a shift to higher 
collection of direct taxes on corporate profits and individuals should be considered.  
It has been noted that personal income taxes in developing countries rates are often 
not progressive in practice (Birdsall and Torre, 2001). Even when the statutory tax 
rates are high and seem to be progressive, multiple exemptions and other loopholes 
combined with lax tax administration and enforcement make the actual taxes paid by 
richer groups effectively much lower.  
In addition to improving tax collection and getting rid of loopholes, there is a case for 
expenditure taxes that target the rich. This can be done by increasing rates or levying 
new taxes on certain types of luxury expenditure, relating to both goods and services, 
such as taxes on foreign travel, on consumption in luxury hotels, on purchases made 
in high-end shopping malls, on imports of non-necessities, or on purchase of luxury 
vehicles. This can also serve the function of stabilising consumption over economic 
cycles, by reducing the extent of speculation-driven consumption booms.    13 
Given the high costs of efficient tax administration and the problems associated with 
enforcement, developing countries need to think of corruption-resistant tax structures 
(Stiglitz and Emran, 2004) that are more automatic and rule -based rather than 
involving individual discretion. This is a consideration that makes instruments like 
trade taxes and turnover taxes on financial transactions especially attractive, since 
they can be levied mechanically and therefore even-handedly. Expenditure taxes on 
luxury consumption also share this advantage. 
Selective taxes on capital 
A strong case can be made for certain types of taxes on capital that can be imposed in 
developing countries without damaging prospects of more investment. Moreover, 
direct taxes on capital are relatively easier to collect than a range of indirect taxes, 
which are also usually more regressive. Some options include: 
•  Taxes on foreign exchange transactions. These can curb potentially 
destabilising speculative behaviour to some extent, and can also provide 
significant resources to the public exchequer. They are easy to collect, and 
where turnover taxes on foreign exchange transactions have been imposed (a 
“Tobin tax”), they have had no apparent adverse impact upon aggregate rates 
of investment domestically. The turnover tax rate should be so low, say, less 
than 0.1 per cent, that it would hardly affect real transactions, such as export 
and import payments, o r remittances by workers abroad, but would still 
operate as a disincentive for purely speculative currency flows.  
•  Taxes on all financial transactions, at a very low rate that does not affect 
transactions of a productive intent. These can be useful in raising resources in 
periods of financial sector boom, and at the same time dampen unsustainable 
asset prices increases often associated with such booms. They are also among 
the most easily enforceable of all taxes, which is a major point in their favour.  
•  Capital gains taxes. These can and should be used more widely but with some 
creativity, especially upon financial assets. Not only would this provide more 
revenue, but differential tax rates on different kinds of financial assets and 
their transfer can prevent excessive speculative activity in domestic financial 
markets. Obviously, they must be used flexibly and constantly monitored so 
that they do not add to pressures for capital flight in periods of financial stress.  
•  Taxes on income from assets held abroad. These may require international 
agreements, but they are especially worth pursuing where a substantial 
proportion of domestic residents’ wealth is held in foreign assets.  
•  Wealth taxes. Although the role of such taxes has been much reduced in recent 
times, wealth taxes transfer resources from richer groups to government and 
can be very effective in raising national savings rates. This is because a lot of 
consumption by the rich in developing countries leaks out in the form of 
import-intensive consumption o r direct consumption abroad, while financial 
liberalisation allows wealth holders in developing countries to shift some of 
their savings abroad. A tax on gross assets can be used, as in Mexico, as a 
minimum corporate tax deductible on corporate income tax.  
•  Differential taxes to promote “more desirable” types of FDI, in particular 
“green field” FDI. This is important because the rush to attract foreign capital 
inflows in general has led many developing countries to promise or create   14 
conditions for untenably high rates of return on such investment, which 
become hard to maintain and are easily reversed with the slightest perception 
of domestic instability of any kind. 1 In order to be able to impose such taxes 
with confidence, developing countries need to be sure of which forms of 
foreign investment they welcome and which are less likely to contribute to the 
economy. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that there are likely to be 
difficulties in collecting such taxes in practice, and that there may be 
administrative costs in trying to prevent or minimise such tax avoidance.  
Trade taxes 
Another set of options centres on trade taxes. Easier collection is also an attribute of 
trade taxes, but their role has been greatly reduced in the recent past as reductions in 
import tariffs and removal of export taxes have been part of the global process of 
trade liberalisation. Such reduction of trade taxes has obviously had some impact on 
domestic incentives and production structures. But it has also substantially reduced 
revenues available to developing country governments. While WTO obligations and 
other constraints have significantly reduced available options for imposing trade taxes 
for most developing countries, there is still some scope for using these creatively to 
generate more public revenues and dampen cyclical fluctuations emanating from 
international economic conditions. 
A number of trade taxes are WTO-compatible and would also provide more revenue. 
Some examples are:  
•  Taxes on imported luxury goods. 
•  Export taxes on certain important export commodities. These can play a very 
useful role in generating more public revenue in periods of export price boom, 
as they have in Argentina in the recent past. However, their imposition should 
be responsive to changing international market conditions. 
•  A system of variable tariffs on a range of agricultural and industrial goods, 
operating in a band within the WTO tariff bindings, such that international 
price volatility is not immediately translated into domestic relative price 
volatility.
2 This is especially important for primary commodities whose world 
trade prices have fluctuated greatly in the past decade. But it is also likely to 
                                                  
1 The developing countries that have been most successful in attracting FDI, such as the People’s 
Republic of China and Taiwan Province of China, have maintained a wide range of regulations 
governing such investment, including not only differential taxes but also enforced technology transfer. 
In contrast, many countries that have provided huge tax concessions to  foreign capital, or offered 
guaranteed rates of return on utilities that ultimately imply large losses for the state exchequer, have 
still not been favoured as destinations for FDI. Often, this is because such countries have low rates of 
public investment, implying relatively poor infrastructure and lower domestic rates of economic 
growth, hence are less attractive to foreign investment. In such circumstances, tax policies that generate 
more revenue for public investment in infrastructure are more likely to have positive effects in 
attracting desired FDI I n the medium term than all the possible fiscal incentives. 
 
2 For example, a country that regularly or periodically imports a good that substitutes a good which is 
also domestically produced can choose to ensure that the post-tariff price of the imported good remains 
within a certain range even if there are fluctuations in the international price, because the tariff adjusts 
to ensure stability. This means that the import prices do not have a destabilising e ffect on either 
domestic production or consumption.   15 
be significant for some manufacturing goods in future, given the current 
evidence of substantial increases in manufacturing production capacity 
especially in large developing countries. For some commodities, variable 
tariffs may conflict with WTO rules for member countries.  
Trade-related issues are discussed in greater depth in the Trade Policy Note. 
Managing the public provision of services 
Sometimes returns from publicly held assets can provide resources for the 
government, in particular the revenues from public holding of natural resource 
corporations, utilities and other service providers. Prices of such goods and services 
are administered prices, and can be sources of either public revenues or losses. 
However, as noted in the series Policy Notes, such administered prices are not 
primarily to be seen as sources of public revenue.  
Publicly provided goods and services fulfil important social goals, indeed basic needs, 
and it is not usually appropriate to price them according to purely commercial criteria, 
although the fiscal implications of the pricing strategy must be managed. The 
distributive implications, and the structure of incentives generated in the economy, are 
critical in assessing particular pricing strategies for such administered prices.  
For example, an across-the-board increase in some administered prices and user costs 
(such as basic water  rates, public health services and so on) will directly affect the 
poor in an adverse way. On the other hand, graduated and progressively increasing 
tariffs on some public services and utilities is usually a good idea, requiring larger, 
usually richer, users to pay more towards their provision, and going some way 
towards a user-payment principle. Thus, graduated, and sharply increasing, tariffs on 
electricity and water use beyond a basic minimum, can generate revenues to cross-
subsidise smaller, usually poorer, consumers and to extend service provision to the 
poor. 
It can be argued that such pricing strategies need not be confined only to public sector 
activities, since it is theoretically possible for a well-designed privatisation to include 
the possibility of continued cross-subsidisation. Similarly, it is also possible to think 
in principle of a progressive consumption tax on utilities that could still make it 
possible for the government to access revenues from such services.  
However, in practice these goa ls have proved hard to achieve. Private investors in 
utilities have tended to resist, and have often been successful in avoiding, extensive 
cross-subsidisation that would ensure universal access to all citizens, including the 
poor, at reasonable rates. The experience of water privatisation in countries as 
different as Bolivia and South Africa confirms this. Similarly, governments have 
found that transaction costs of progressively taxing the consumption of utilities has 
been very high, and governments in most countries have typically not been able to 
raise much revenue from this source. This makes it harder – and more expensive – to 
provide such facilities and services to the whole population, including the poor.  
There can be other purely fiscal reasons for continued public ownership of productive 
assets. Obviously, public ownership, or some form of subsidy to private investors, is 
required whenever social returns are higher than private returns to any investment. 
But public ownership is also worthwhile in other cases, as long as the returns from 
such assets are higher than the prevailing rate of interest on government debt, as this 
then provides a cheaper means of financing necessary public expenditure than more   16 
government borrowing. The question of ensuring  that such returns are actually 
achieved then becomes one of proper management.  
These are important considerations in any discussion of the privatisation of state 
assets. While this is covered in detail in the SOE Reform Policy Note, some points 
need to be stated here as they are of direct relevance to fiscal policy.  
First, as has been noted, in all cases of economic activities with positive externalities, 
there is some role for government intervention, and the only question is what that role 
should be. It should not be assumed that regulation of private activity is costless; 
rather, it is often costly, and can be difficult because of information asymmetries. This 
means that regulation of private activity may actually be more distorting and less 
desirable than direct government ownership under certain conditions.  
The second point relates to government revenues. In most privatization cases, 
governments typically receive less than the “true” value of the assets they sell. This is 
not only because of corruption, which often arises in the privatization process, but 
also because of the very nature of the transaction. Whenever a government chooses to 
sell off an asset, it thereby foregoes the associated income. If the future income flow 
from this asset is equal to or more than the prevailing interest rate on government 
securities, then the government would be a net loser of future income by selling it. 
However, a private buyer will only purchase the asset if it provides at least a rate of 
return equal to the rate of interest on government securities, because that is where the 
private investor could otherwise put the money. This means that for such sales to 
occur, either (a) the private investor must believe that it is capable of generating more 
profits than the public sector, or (b) the asset must be undervalued so that the actual 
rate of return for the private buyer turns out to be higher. This is why most such 
privatizations involve the undervaluation of public assets, although the degree of 
undervaluation can depend upon specific features of each case, including cronyism 
and corruption. Therefore, since such deals really involve the loss of a stream of 
income to a government that is usually already short of resources, it cannot be good 
for either the government fiscal position or the economy as a whole. 
The case for privatization then depends critically on the assumption that private 
ownership and management will ensure more efficiency and profitability than public. 
This argument is discussed in the SOE Reform Policy Note. Here, it need only be 
noted that there is neither compelling theory nor convincing empirical evidence that 
public enterprises are necessarily less efficient than private ones. There are of course 
numerous examples in developing countries of state o wned enterprises that neither 
generate positive social returns nor public revenue, but instead are inefficient vehicles 
of state patronage. But this is not inevitably the case – some state-owned enterprises 
in developing countries, including China, India, Singapore and others, rank among the 
most profitable and efficient enterprises in the world. The issue is therefore one of 
ensuring proper management of such enterprises, and allowing them enough 
autonomy to make them effective without sacrificing the emphasis on social goals.  
Using ODA effectively 
Foreign aid has come down substantially in the past two decades, both as a proportion 
of richer countries' GDP, and in proportion to the GDP and investment of developing 
countries. Nevertheless, ODA still helps  to finance a significant proportion of the 
government deficit or even the balance of payments deficit of some countries.    17 
It is now recognised that such aid has mixed effects on growth prospects, largely 
depending on how it is utilised. There has been much discussion in recent times of the 
role that ODA can have in creating “Dutch disease” effects by causing an appreciation 
of the exchange rate (Gupta et al., 2005; McKinley, 2005). Section VI provides a 
more extended discussion of “Dutch disease” issues; here we consider the 
macroeconomic effects of ODA and how to ensure that positive effects dominate. 
The positive macroeconomic and growth effects of ODA are obvious, especially for 
poor, foreign exchange-constrained developing countries. ODA can reduce three gaps 
that keep domestic investment and growth below potential: the savings gap, the 
foreign exchange gap and the fiscal gap. It is sometimes argued that thinking in terms 
of these gaps is no longer relevant for developing countries, given international 
capital mobility. However, a large number of developing countries cannot access 
international capital markets as much as they would like, and continue to experience 
actual or implicit foreign exchange shortages. Therefore, foreign aid that fills the gaps 
mentioned above can be very important for small developing countries, especially 
those that are keen to use public investment to generate higher aggregate economic 
growth in a stable way; otherwise, such investment could lead to balance of payments 
problems or cause domestic inflation where there are domestic supply constraints. It 
effectively amounts to an addition to domestic savings and allows governments to 
spend more than the revenues raised through taxation and other means. It can 
therefore allow for more accumulation through public investment in critical areas, 
including infrastructure and critical social spending with future social productivity 
implications, such as in health and education.  
However, aid inflows can have negative effects. The most widely recognised of these 
is that such inflows, like other forms of capital inflow, put upward pressure on 
exchange rates which can then shift domestic incentives away from tradeables to non-
tradeables, if domestic relative prices move in response. The consequent changes are 
likely to be sharper where there has already been extensive trade liberalisation, 
involving a move away from quantitative restrictions on imports. Foreign aid can also 
cause higher inflation when it is spent not on imports but on government spending on 
non-tradeables or domestic activities in which there are supply constraints preventing 
output from expanding to meet the enhanced demand. A deeper critique relates to the 
potential negative effect of foreign aid on domestic savings, and the possible 
substitution of foreign savings for domestic savings. However, if the two are not 
perfect substitutes, aid will imply an increase in investible resources in the aggregate.  
Under certain conditions, foreign aid can act as a constraint on autonomous growth. 
In economies that have already opened up the external trade account and do not have 
specific measures to control imports other than flat rate tariffs, any upward tendency 
of the currency resulting from aid inflows can result in cheaper, and therefore 
increased, imports and more expensive exports. When aid inflows push up exchange 
rates in countries with open trade and tight government fiscal stances, some economic 
activities become uncompetitive, leading to losses of potential income and 
employment in return for relatively little per capita aid. Cambodia, a small country 
where foreign aid is a significant proportion of the government budget and of national 
income, has experienced such problems.  
So, how can ODA be used to maximise its positive effects, and minimise the negative 
ones? If ODA is used to increase public investment in important areas to ease supply 
constraints and improve aggregate productivity, it will not be inflationary and can   18 
have expansionary effects. These effects could spill over  into positive balance of 
payments effects through more exports or reduced imports. So it is important to 
ensure that ODA translates into higher public investment, preferably in areas where 
there are shortages or which form bottlenecks for production, or in areas where 
existing levels of provision are socially sub-optimal.  
The problem in many developing countries today is that the fear of the adverse effects 
of currency appreciation is so great, and the need to keep higher levels of foreign 
exchange reserves to guard against potential financial crises is so acutely felt, that aid 
inflows are not put to good use (McKinley, 2005). Instead, a common tendency is to 
combine such inflows of foreign exchange with deflationary domestic policies to 
ensure rising levels of foreign exchange reserves – both as insurance against future 
instability and to prevent upward movements of the currency which could damage 
external competitiveness and reduce the viability of domestic enterprises. In some 
cases in recent years, this tendency has gone so far that ODA is effectively not used at 
all to reduce the three gaps mentioned above, and therefore cannot play a positive 
role. However, if recipient governments can avoid this trap and use ODA for 
productive public investment that c ontributes to current and future growth, its 
macroeconomic effects will be positive (Reddy and Minoiu, 2006) 
Government spending 
Patterns of government expenditure 
Public expenditure is absolutely crucial to both stability and growth in developing 
economies. However, the direction of public investment is important. Most 
developing countries do not have the luxury of increasing public investment in all 
areas in which it is needed; prioritisation is unavoidable.  
Previously, there tended to be greater emphasis on public investments with higher 
growth implications, for example, in infrastructure and capital goods industries. This 
followed from the perception that most developing economies are constrained by 
supply bottlenecks in critical areas, usually infrastructure.  
A counter-position now emphasises public expenditure in activities that generate more 
employment and demand, to kick-start macroeconomic processes that will create 
enhanced output through supply responses. 
In most developing countries, the goal of full employment is made more complex by 
the prevalence of two distinct forms of excess labour relative to demand due to:  
(a) structural factors – such as inadequate aggregate capital, choice of technology, 
asset inequalities and institutional forms that inhibit greater investment – that 
lead to the persistence of open unemployment or high underemployment, and  
(b) cyclical or more short-term factors that lead to unemployment levels that can 
be corrected by more expansionary fiscal and monetary policies.  
Public i nvestment is a key that can open both doors, by increasing demand in the 
short run and also enlarging the capital base of the economy. The nature, direction and 
efficacy of such investment are important as the multiplier effects and long-term 
growth implications will differ accordingly.  
However, public investment is not a strategy to be employed in isolation. It is 
important to be attentive to other structural features such as technology choice, asset   19 
inequalities and institutional conditions. Nevertheless, within the scope of short run 
macro policies, public investment is the most potent instrument for generating both 
growth and employment. 
In brief, there is no “one size fits all” approach to the ordering of public investment 
priorities. They must differ  according to the particular circumstances of each 
economy. But, public investment requires at the very least a medium term time 
horizon, possibly longer, if it is to be effective. Therefore it must occur within a 
systematic framework that involves some overall strategy for the future. Putting 
priorities to government expenditure is a political task, but its strategic aspects should 
not be ignored, and governments must be conscious of the longer-term growth 
implications of public spending.  
In recent times, such a positive attitude towards public investment has given way to a 
more hesitant approach, one that reduces the proposed arenas of action to allegedly 
desired or proper areas of public expenditure. It is argued that the government should 
stay out of those areas that the private sector is willing and able to invest in, and limit 
itself to providing an appropriate mix of fiscal and other incentives and regulation to 
ensure that the private provision is socially optimal.  
According to this view, instead of  focussing on economic activities (in what were 
earlier seen as natural monopolies and now appear to be contestable markets), 
developing country governments should focus on social sector expenditures alone, 
where it is almost universally accepted that there will be private under-provision. The 
focus of public expenditure is supposed to be confined to primary education and 
public health, and away from physical infrastructure and actual production of capital 
goods and intermediates.  
In practice, many shortcomings and difficulties have emerged, as many developing 
countries have found out to their cost. Often, when governments have reduced 
investment in certain areas, private agents have not been forthcoming in sufficient 
measure, despite the very large concessions provided which in turn often place a great 
burden on the exchequer.  
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Many socially necessary or desirable investments involve large initial outlays and 
long gestation periods. Given the various uncertainties involved, many factors inhibit 
private, including multinational, investment, even if numerous incentives are 
provided. This is particularly the case in small countries that are prone to political 
upheavals or economic instability for reasons outside the government's control.  
                                                  
3 Calculated from ILO Yearbook of International Labour Statistics, 2003.  
Box 2   
Should public sector employment be downsized? 
There is a widespread perception that fiscal restraint should be associated with downsizing of 
public employment. Besides the benefit of reduced government expenditure, this is justified 
on the grounds that less employment in any enterprise or public activity proves that the 
enterprise is more efficient, a sign of good health, good economics and good sense. But this 
can have adverse resul ts, in its impact on society and even on the overall fiscal stance.  
International experience suggests that obsessive downsizing of the workforce can be socially 
damaging. For example, in Britain, the reduction of staff strength in the privatised railway 
system has been associated with a deterioration of service, with many more accidents, 
inordinate delays, frequent unannounced changes of schedule and a much more surly 
workforce which has to work longer hours and more intensely without security of contract. 
Some Latin American privatisations of important public utilities have resulted in not just job 
losses, but also declining safety precautions and reduced service effectiveness. Cost-cutting 
pressures have prevented attainment of required levels of employment, while the remaining 
workers are unable to match delivery levels associated with the previous larger workforce. 
Undoubtedly, there are situations of over-manning in government departments and public 
enterprises. In general, however, aggregate public sector employment in most developing 
countries is not excessive. The ratio of public sector workers to total population is 5 per 100 
in OECD countries; the international average is 3. But, for developing countries it is 2, and 
for Sub-Saharan Africa it is only 1 per 100.
3 This translates to less public services provided 
per capita of population. Whether in basic transport and infrastructure, adequate housing or 
sanitation, or universal access to minimum decent health facilities and educational 
opportunities, the gap between social need and actual availability is huge. Downsizing public 
sector employment may also lead to a transfer of some public services (such as health, 
education, etc.) to the household, using unpaid labour, resulting in additional burdens on 
women. 
This suggests that in most circumstances the government should spend more on such areas 
and employ more people, not less. If public sector workers are underemployed, the solution is 
to use their services more effectively and productively, through retraining and redeployment.  
Many developing countries put more emphasis on military and policing functions, rather than 
public services. The focus should be new public employment in areas of clear social need 
such as health, sanitation and education. However, necessary administrative functions should 
not be understaffed.    21 
So private investment in important areas “freed” for private players is usually not 
enough to meet the requirements of the economy, and turns out to be even more 
expensive for the taxpayer than public investment because of the fiscal costs of 
meeting various incentives such as guaranteed rates of return on investment. In the 
case of the energy producer Enron and the state government of Maharashtra in India, 
for example, the government ended up paying much more for power that still has not 
been produced and distributed than it would have if it had simply set up a plant itself.  
In short, governments need to take a more holistic approach towards determining the 
areas to be covered by public investment and provision, rather than automatically 
excluding areas where it is assumed that private players may be interested.  
The implications of government deficits 
Public expenditure and taxation have distributive implications. It is generally assumed 
that the aggregate fiscal stance is relevant only for aggregate growth patterns. 
However, whether this stance results in greater or less employment generation has 
distributive implications, increasingly seen as very important in most countries today.  
Box 3   
Macro policies and growth: The Indian case 
It is now accepted that the shift to a higher economic growth trajectory in India came about 
not in the 1990s, after neo-liberal economic reforms, but a decade earlier, from the early 
1980s. This is a useful example of how various factors contributed to a changed investment 
climate thereby generating higher growth.  
According to Chandrasekhar and Ghosh (2004), the 1980s escape from economic stagnation 
and the shift to a more rapid growth trajectory was enabled by three major factors: 
1.  a big  increase in the fiscal stimulus provided by government spending directed to 
rural areas to a greater extent than before, with positive multiplier effects. It was 
associated with growing fiscal deficits, as government revenues did not increase in 
proportion.  
2.  substantial import liberalization, especially of capital goods and components for 
manufacturing. This import liberalization for inputs and intermediate goods created 
an impetus for private investment to enter a range of consumer durable goods 
production.   
3.  associated with both was a shift to external commercial borrowing by the state to 
finance the increase in the fiscal and current account deficits.  
The model of public sector-led expansion could continue a decade without generating higher 
inflation because of import liberalization, financed by government external borrowing 
exploiting the “new” access to foreign exchange afforded by changes in international finance.  
Rodrik and Subramanian (2004) pointed to the “attitudinal shift” in the government in the 
early 1980s, which was pro-business (rather than pro-market as subsequently) and favoured 
the interests of existing businesses rather than new entrants or consumers. According to them, 
such a small attitudinal shift elicited a large productivity response. In fact, not only existing 
businesses benefited; the period saw the rise of many new businesses that eventually became 
significant regionally and globally, e.g., Reliance Industries, which became one of the top five 
global petrochemical producers by 2000. But government’s attitudinal shift, also expressed in 
micro policies favouring large capital, influenced the rate and pattern of private investment.  
This combination of forces led to higher growth rates in the 1980s, but it culminated in the 
economic crisis of 1990-91. The build-up of external debt and continued large government 
deficits created an unsustainable growth process after a decade. However, even in the 
subsequent period, fiscal stimulus remained important for aggregate growth in India.   22 
This is also the case with fiscal deficits, which have both overall effects and 
differential impacts upon particular social groups. While rentier groups may oppose 
larger fiscal deficits under all conditions, workers and citizens availing of public 
services may welcome deficits if they are associated with public expenditure that 
leads to more employment or increased provision of public services or act in a 
countercyclical way. An obsession with controlling fiscal deficits according to some 
arbitrary norm, as is usual in a lot of recent legislation around such deficits, adversely 
affects the possibilities for countercyclical macroeconomic stances and reduces the 
developmental or growth-oriented activities of the government.  
Even when fiscal deficits are to be reduced, there is a basic problem with making 
expenditure cuts the essential means of doing so. A reduction in the revenue, or the 
fiscal, deficit can be effected in a number of ways besides expenditure cuts. The most 
obvious is an increase in direct tax revenues, which are typically more desirable in 
developing economies with high levels of income and asset inequality; this can occur 
along the lines discussed above. Also, trade taxes can be seriously considered as a 
means of public resource mobilisation, again along the lines mentioned above.  
A more recent argument is that fiscal  deficits are destabilizing because of its impact 
on the expectations of investors who can move their capital out of the country. In an 
economy that is liberalised with respect to the capital account of the balance of 
payments, hence open to speculative capital flows, it may be the case that speculators 
look at the size of the fiscal deficit, which thus becomes a determinant of their state of 
confidence. In such cases, policy makers need to be aware that increases in fiscal 
deficits seen as necessary for counter-cyclical purposes or for future growth may need 
to be accompanied by measures to prevent capital from flowing out because of 
adverse investor expectations. Such measures can include lock-in periods for foreign 
investors, constraints on capital export by domestic residents, and the like; these are 
covered more comprehensively in the Financial Policies Note.  
It is also important to note the negative role that can be played by poor accounting 
frameworks, which include certain items as part of the deficit without considering the 
overall context (Stiglitz et al., 2006). For example, IMF accounting practice of 
including foreign aid in the expenditure budgets (and therefore deficits) has led to 
excessive fiscal stringency in the case of several African govern ments, even in 
situations where more expansionary policies would have been more appropriate.  
Obviously, this does not mean that running fiscal deficits is always desirable, or that 
governments can adopt a “spend now, repent later” mode in choosing the fiscal 
stance. Rather, it points to the need for greater flexibility with respect to fiscal targets, 
especially when the deficits are the result of productive public expenditure, and 
during economic downswings.  
Fiscal sustainability is a crucial medium term  issue. However, it can be made 
compatible with increased public productive investment especially when combined 
with higher tax revenues from those who can afford to pay and some controls on 
capital movements to prevent destabilising flows of resources; rigid rules on fiscal 
deficits in the short run reduce the possibility of effective countercyclical policies by 
governments, including in open developing economies. For example, the ability of 
countries like Malaysia and the Republic of Korea to recover relatively rapidly from 
the debt crisis of the late 1990s was directly related to the expansionary fiscal stance 
adopted by their governments after the sharp downturn of 1998.    23 
Are fiscal deficits always bad? 
The conventional view that fiscal deficits are always “bad” is based on three 
arguments. First, it is argued that a fiscal deficit can be inflationary, or that it will 
cause external deficits, and is therefore destabilising. Second, it is suggested that large 
fiscal deficits will “crowd out” more desirable  private investment by reducing the 
investible resources available to the private sector and raising the interest rate on 
borrowing. Third, it is argued that, even if fiscal deficits do not cause inflation, they 
lead to the accumulation of public debt and mounting future interest obligations of the 
government, and therefore are not sustainable.  
None of these are necessarily true. Their validity depend upon specific conditions 
which may not hold in practice, so that the advantages of fiscal deficits – more output 
and employment – may outweigh the disadvantages.  
Consider the first argument, that fiscal deficits are inflationary or lead to balance of 
trade deficits. Both of these outcomes – inflation or external deficit – emerge from an 
excess of aggregate demand ex ante over aggregate supply. But the size of the fiscal 
deficit, which shows only the net demand from the government sector, does not 
necessarily tell us anything about aggregate excess demand. It is possible to have any 
combination of public or private surplus or deficit, which would lead to very different 
outcomes with respect to both inflation and external deficits.  
The standard identity for an open economy: 
Private Investment - Private Savings + Government Deficit = Current Account Deficit 
allows for a government deficit which does not involve a current account deficit if the 
private sector saves more than it invests by the same amount. It can similarly allow 
for the opposite situation in which a surplus on the government account is associated 
with a current account deficit if the private sector account is in deficit, i.e. private 
investment is greater than private savings by more than the amount of the government 
surplus. 
So it is quite possible for a large public deficit to be entirely financed by a voluntary 
private sector savings surplus. This was the case in Italy for more than a decade from 
the mid-1980s, when fiscal deficits of as much as 9 per cent of GDP were met by 
positive private savings-investment balances of equal proportions.  
Similarly, there can be large balance of payments deficits or higher inflation in 
countries with low, zero or positive fiscal accounts, when the private sector spends 
more than it earns. This was the case in many Southeast Asian economies before the 
crisis of the late 1990s, and is currently true of the United States economy.  
One of the more interesting features of some “emerging economies” in the developing 
world from the 1990s onwards has been that strict fiscal discipline and low public 
deficits or government  budget surpluses have been associated with large external 
deficits resulting from private profligacy permitted by economic liberalisation. 
It is obvious that fiscal deficits will lead to inflation only if public expenditure does 
not create multiplier effects that cause output to expand, because of supply 
bottlenecks. Such supply constraints do exist in many developing countries, but they 
are less evident in a world where imports can be used to bridge the gap temporarily. It 
is certainly possible for developing countries to use the fiscal stance to address 
situations of excess capacity or cyclical downswing, without such adverse effects. 
Obviously, this is not an argument for continued or larger fiscal deficits over time –   24 
there should be attention directed towards ensuring fiscal balance over the medium 
term, which would be possible if the deficits are pre-dominantly financing public 
productive expenditure.  
The second argument that public investment will “crowd out” private investment is 
based on two assumptions: that government demand for borrowed funds will cause a 
rise in prevailing market interest rates, and that a rise in such rates will in turn depress 
private investment.  
Both assumptions are problematic. The government administers Interest rates through 
the central bank. Insofar as they rise, this reflects policy choices made by the 
government, such as when such a move is seen as required for attracting foreign 
savings. In financially liberalised economies interest rates tend to rise not because of 
demand for credit from the government but because of the need to attract and 
maintain investor confidence. In open developing countries they are therefore 
crucially affected by international interest rates, in particular in the developed world. 
Higher interest rates can be compatible with substantially lower levels of the fiscal 
deficit as a share of GDP. Also, when investors' expectations about future profitability 
are bullish – for example because of substantial infrastructure investment by the state 
which would give rise to positive demand and supply linkages with private industry – 
investment will increase despite higher interest rates. Further, crowding out is 
unlikely to be a problem when there is excess capacity in the economy, since public 
spending in such cases will lead to higher output.  
The third argument against fiscal deficits is the possibility of the undesirable build up 
of public debt. An important distinction should be made between the revenue deficit 
(that is, the difference between current expenditures over revenues) and the fiscal 
deficit as a whole, which includes this revenue deficit as well as public productive 
investment. In general debt-financed revenue deficits, that is borrowing to meet 
current expenditures, should be controlled. However, even for revenue deficits, there 
are certain cases, such as a slump, when government tax revenues may fall but 
revenue spending should not always be cut simply to balance the books, since debt 
financed public expenditure may even be necessary to lift the economy out of the 
slump. Obviously, this should not be the practice in “normal” times.  
The case of fiscal deficits is more complex. There is nothing necessarily wrong with 
borrowing to meet investment requirements. Indeed, there is a case for a fiscal deficit 
composed entirely of public capital investment,  as long as the social rate of return 
from such investment exceeds the rate of interest. There are many crucial areas, for 
example in physical and social infrastructure, where public investment is essential 
since the presence of externalities means that the private sector is not likely to invest 
at socially optimal levels. Thus, there is a crucial role for the government as an 
investor, and the government can and should borrow to invest in socially necessary 
areas, whether infrastructure or public services. Other public investments that add to 
the deficit can be considered as long as the projected social returns are higher than the 
projected interest rate. If these investments are socially productive, they will result in 
higher government revenues in future, because of the growth generated over time. If 
such investments involve social returns lower than the projected interest rate, they 
should be financed out of government revenues rather than through borrowing.    25 
Managing public debt 
Developing countries need to work out the appropriate level of public debt and then to 
achieve that norm. There is a basic rule of thumb: rates of return on debt-financed 
investment should not be lower than rates of interest, to avoid a debt spiral. But there 
are other issues as well. There are many views on what should be the ratio of public 
debt to national income. Many developing countries currently look to the European 
Union's criterion for the Growth and Stability Pact, of not allowing the ratio to cross 
60 per cent, but this is also no more than an arbitrary rule of thumb, not backed by 
solid economic reasoning.  
For developing countries, the issue is further complicated by the fact that external 
public debt has very different implications from internal debt, and can expose 
developing economies to financial crises that undermine the internal financial system 
as well.  
Financial liberalisation measures usually operate to increase interest rates on public 
debt, by forcing governments to enter the open market for debt and removing interest 
ceilings which used to operate in most developing countries. As a result, public debt 
piles up faster than before if tax revenues do not increase at the same rate as interest 
rate increases. For many developing countries, this process alone has generated a 
“debt trap” in which a large proportion of government current expenditure, sometimes 
as much as the entire fiscal deficit, go towards interest payments and, even then, are 
not sufficient to cover them. Therefore, since the interest rate on government 
borrowing can be managed (see below), and governments generally remain preferred 
borrowers for financial markets, it is desirable to use interest rate policy to keep the 
accrual of public debt within limits and prevent exploding levels of debt.  
If a country is already in what may be perceived as an unsustainable debt situation, 
different issues are involved in trying to get out of it. The accumulated experience of 
financial and debt crises in developing countries has provided some insights into how 
to go about the process of restructuring public debt when the debt burden becomes 
excessive or simply impossible to service.    26 
Debt restructuring can play a very useful role by getting rid of the debt overhang, 
allowing public resources that were tied up in debt servicing to be put to productive 
use and generally allowing policy makers to get on with the process of growth and 
development. The conditions under which debt is restructured can range from very 
easy or preferred options for debtors, with some implicit d ebt write-off and low 
interest rates on rolled over debt, to very painful options involving much higher 
interest on debt which has multiplied because all unpaid interest has been added to the 
principal. But the extent to which restructuring is possible, or involves less painful 
policy conditions than imposing “austerity” upon the poor, depends upon the ability 
of the government concerned to bargain with creditors and hold out for the best deal 
without agreeing to potentially very damaging conditions. It is wrong to assume that 
debtor countries have few options but to accept very adverse conditions for debt 
restructuring. The recent experience of Argentina’s successful restructuring of a 
Box 4   
Desirable levels of public debt 
It is very hard to set strict norms about the desirable level of public debt as it depends on 
many conditions other than the rate of growth of GDP. Usually, some ratio of debt to GDP is 
taken as the relevant indicator, for example, the European Union’s 60 per cent of GDP norm 
for the maximum public dent. This is of course quite arbitrary, since lower or higher levels 
could be sustainable depending upon the rate of growth of GDP over the relevant period. 
Further, it does not make a distinction between internal and external public debt, which can be 
a very important consideration for low-income developing countries in particular.  
Instead of looking only at absolute levels of debt in relation to GDP, the flow payments 
associated with stocks of debt should also be noted. Some basic rules to be borne in mind are:  
(a)  There must be medium term stability of debt levels, that is, countries must locate 
themselves within debt cycles that involve periods of net inflow or debt accrual 
followed by periods of net outflow or debt repayment. The length of these periods 
depends upon the nature of the debt-financed investment and its effects. 
(b)  Countries should avoid exploding aggregate levels of public debt, that is, levels of debt 
that increase progressively each year, as it will become unsustainable in the medium 
term.  
(c)  Public external debt in particular should be biased as far as possible towards bonds and 
longer maturity loans bearing lower interest rates. An important issue for many 
developing countries is the maturity structure of public debt. As Stiglitz et al. (2006) 
pointed out, most long-term debt is generally denominated in foreign currencies (which 
involves exchange rate risk) while domestic debt is generally short term. Yet most 
public investment involves long-term returns, which can create a mismatch between 
repayment schedules and the ability to repay. 
(d)  Public debt for purely consumption purposes should be avoided unless much higher 
future tax revenues are anticipated for other reasons (such as demographic changes). 
(e)  The distribution of public debt between internal and external sources should be such as 
to prevent the country from excessive dependence upon foreign creditors. Ideally, most 
public debt should be internal. 
(f)  For external debt, a relation of equality in the medium term (not necessarily in each 
period)  should be maintained between the rate of interest and the rate of increase in 
foreign exchange earnings, whether through exports or labour remittances.  
If these conditions are not met, it is important to think of alternative means of raising public 
resources, such as domestic resource mobilisation, instead of relying on additional external 
borrowing, which can lead to an unsustainable debt situation and even crisis. Such a crisis can 
occur even with relatively low ratios of public debt to GDP, if most of the debt is external. It 
is necessary to take note of these conditions rather than the conventional stock-flow measure.   27 
significant part of its external debt suggests this can be achieved with adequate 
political will, even under conditions of prolonged and intense crisis.  
IV.  MONETARY POLICIES 
Expanding the policy space 
It was once held that the basic goal of macroeconomic policy was to achieve internal 
balance, defined as full employment, and external balance, defined as balance on the 
external account. If there was unemployment and excess capacity in the economy, the 
aim of fiscal and monetary policies would be to generate sufficient economic 
expansion to reach the full employment target; going b eyond that target would 
generate inflation because of supply bottlenecks. Openness complicates the picture 
not only because of the effect of domestic expansion upon the current account of the 
balance of payments, but also because of the possible effect upon capital flows. In the 
basic Keynesian framework, achieving both internal and external balance requires the 
use of not only the domestic levers of policy but also the exchange rate. 
Monetary policy was seen as part of this overall strategy of aggregate demand 
management combined with exchange rate management. In this strategy, inflation 
control was only one of its several simultaneous aims. In developing countries, the 
monetary policy was directed not only to the broad level of economic activity and 
employment, but also to specific aims such as ensuring investment, including in 
particular areas, or even poverty reduction.  
Monetary policy was therefore an integral part of macroeconomic and overall 
development strategies, and not only about price stabilisation and inflation control, 
much less inflation targeting. It aimed at expanding supply in strategic sectors, 
improving livelihood conditions in sectors employing a large proportion of the labour 
force such as agriculture, generating more productive employment by providing 
institutional credit to small scale producers in all sectors, and so on. These remain 
critical features of monetary and financial policy, but they have been progressively 
submerged by the obsession with price stability as the basic remit of monetary policy.  
These broader concerns, and the focus on development banking, need to be revived 
for developing economies to achieve sustained and employment-generating growth. 
As the re-emergence of these broader concerns in monetary policy is contingent upon 
a more critical stance towards the narrow remit of inflation targeting, we examine 
some of the basic underpinnings of this narrow remit en route to re-establishing the 
validity of the broader, more flexible approach.  
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Box 5   
Monetary Policy in the West Asia Region 
Liberated from the straitjacket of tight inflation targeting, monetary policy could contribute to 
pro-equity growth. Used as the major instrument for macroeconomic management, monetary 
policy can do little to make growth pro-poor. However, in support of an expansionary fiscal 
policy it can indirectly foster growth that is pro-poor. As a general rule, if inflationary 
pressures are weak, this support would take the form of positive but low real interest rates and 
an expanding monetary supply. However, interest rates should not be so low as to induce high 
capital-intensity in future output. 
While these guidelines appear simple, their application in Western Asian countries is not 
straightforward. In all the countries in the region, financial markets  are underdeveloped, 
though some exhibit certain forms of financial intermediation. The concrete result of 
underdeveloped financial markets and conditions of regional instability is that Governments 
find it difficult to sell their bonds to private agents. This explains the common practice in the 
region of legislation that requires commercial banks to hold a portion of their reserves in 
government bonds. In practice, this requirement has tended to have an anti-poor bias, because 
it redistributes general revenue to the wealthy as interest payments.  
Narrow financial markets imply that the effectiveness of monetary policy to pool savings, 
stimulate private investment and influence/guide its allocation patterns is low. However, the 
limited ability of the central bank to stimulate investment does not imply that there is no pro-
equity role for the central bank rate. Lower central bank rates would have two pro-equity 
effects: (a) government bonds are held by the wealthy, or the institutions of the wealthy, so 
lowering rates would have a positive impact on income distribution; and (b) lower rates imply 
a smaller domestic debt service in the public budget, producing “fiscal space” for pro-equity 
government expenditure.  
Allowing the money supply to expand moderately faster than real output can also have a pro-
equity impact, by increasing access to credit in “informal” financial markets. It also 
encourages financial “deepening”, that is, the ratio of the money supply to aggregate output, 
which is typically low in the ESCWA region. Money supply management raises the question 
of what instruments would be used to counter inflationary pressures if these became a serious 
policy concern. The key policy issue is what constitutes a “serious concern”. Cross-country 
regressions suggest that inflation is uncorrelated with growth for the rates that characterize 
the ESCWA region. Therefore, if growth and poverty reduction are the goals, a tolerance for 
moderate inflation is required. This is especially the case because, owing to the weakness of 
financial markets, the only effective instrument for reducing inflation in most countries would 
be fiscal contraction. 
In summary, a pro-equity monetary policy requires low real interest rates, a tolerance for 
moderate inflation rates, and an expansion of the money supply that accommodates growth 
and financial deepening. To achieve these outcomes when private banks set exorbitant interest 
rates, it probably would be more pro-equity to finance prudent fiscal deficits by monetization 
rather than by bond sales, which redistribute income to the wealthy. 
Source: Excerpt from ESCWA, Summary of the survey of economic and social developments in the 
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia region, 2005-2006, (E/2006/20), para. 52-56.   29 
Can money supply be controlled by policy? 
It is said that governments can control the money supply, and the desirability of such 
control is based on the belief that the money supply is responsible for inflation, a 
condition allegedly caused by too much money chasing too few goods. 
The reality is that as economies grow more sophisticated, it is always possible for 
new types of liquidity, or “quasi-money” to emerge. In a world of financial innovation 
where quasi-money can be created, the overall liquidity in the system cannot be 
rigidly controlled by the monetary authorities, as was recognised by Nicholas Kaldor 
in 1982. Rather, the actual liquidity in the system is endogenously determined. 
Financial innovation creates new possibilities for liquidity. Thus, credit card 
transactions, bills of exchange, IOUs, hire purchase agreements, all involve the 
creation of liquidity. There have been situations in which share certificates have been 
treated as liquidity. The emergence of futures trading and derivatives has created very 
complex webs of liquidity creation.  
With money taking so many complex forms, many of them near impossible to 
calculate much less regulate, it is impossible for governments to control the actual 
money supply. Rather, the money supply is determined by the workings of the system, 
by the level of economic activity, and the prices at which goods and services are 
traded. This is one clear case where demand creates supply. 
Further, there is no convincing case that increasing money supply causes inflation, 
since it is more likely that the causation is the other way around. Empirically, there is 
no easily discernible relationship between the rates of growth of money supply and of 
inflation on the one hand, and real output growth on the other. The theoretical 
argument is based on the twin assumptions of full employment (or exogenously given 
aggregate supply conditions) and aggregate money supply determined exogenously 
by macro policy. Neither assumption is valid; in particular, the latter assumption of 
money supply being susceptible to control by policy makers is not justified. In 
addition, the notion of a stable “real demand for money” function (where the demand 
for money is determined by the level of real economic activity) is demolished by the 
possibility of speculative  demand for money, a feature that is enhanced by financial 
sophistication and the greater uncertainties of operating in today's economies. This 
means that instead of increasing money supply causing inflation, it is more likely the 
case that higher inflation rates generate changes in money supply broadly defined.  
The critical feature of the demand for money and financial assets, since it is based on 
expectations in uncertain conditions, is that it is inherently volatile, unpredictable, and 
prone to sharp swings. This implies that monetary policy must be associated with 
sufficient regulatory power on the part of the government and the central banks to 
minimise such volatility, as it can have very unfortunate implications for the real 
economy.  
What is evident  from this is  that  the real monetary variable in the hands of the 
government is the interest rate. Thus, attempts to control the money supply typically 
translate into interest rate policy instead. Interest rate management in developing 
countries has to be focused not only on stability but also on growth, that is, interest 
rates should be kept at levels that encourage more investment. This is also where the 
advantages of some amount of directed credit, towards strategic or priority sectors, 
are significant. Of course, interest rates and monetary policy alone cannot work to 
create domestic expansion; they must be accompanied by expansionary fiscal policy.   30 
The critical point is that as far as possible monetary policy should accommodate fiscal 
policy and the overall goals of society, such as growth and employment generation. 
This does not mean that monetary policy should encourage instability in the name of 
growth; rather, it should be part of the broad set of policies which aim to reduce 
volatility and increase economic activity in a balanced and sustainable way. Excessive 
inflation is damaging for equity, stability and growth, but what is perceived as 
“excessive” varies widely across countries. In countries where most incomes, 
including wage incomes, are indexed, there may be social tolerance for inflation 
levels that are internationally high, in the region of 15-20 per cent per annum or more, 
which will also not adversely affect investment. But in countries where the majority 
of the population receives incomes that are not automatically indexed, even inflation 
rates of 10 per cent per annum can be perceived as damaging and destabilising.  
It is important to remember that macroeconomic instability can kill growth, but 
macroeconomic stability (when it is broadly defined so that it is not focussed on a 
narrow target such as inflation) is only a necessary condition for growth, not a 
sufficient one.  
Targeting inflation  
or targeting growth, employment and well-being? 
As noted, in recent years, the focus of monetary policy in many countries across the 
world has changed. Central banks are increasingly oriented to fixing a particular 
target for the inflation rate, and adjusting the interest rate and other banking policies 
accordingly. Other objectives are ignored or become secondary, while the monetary 
authority focuses upon achieving the desired rate of inflation. The extreme case of 
this is found with “independent” central banks (see the Annex for an extended 
discussion of central bank “independence”), which publicly declare a certain desired 
rate of inflation and then adjust monetary levers accordingly. This was first attempted 
in developed countries, but a large number of developing countries have also adopted 
this practice, explicitly or implicitly. It has also been given a seal of approval by the 
multilateral financing institutions as well as organisations of private international 
investors.  
This strategy has been criticised on a number of grounds (Epstein, 2002, 2005; 
Stiglitz et al., 2006). The most common criticisms are:  
4.  This strategy carries high economic, social and political costs, as high real 
interest rates inhibit economic expansion and employment generation; in 
practice, such high real interest rates have been adhered to even in contexts of 
substantial unemployment and persistent poverty.  
5.  It is unnecessary, as there is no convincing evidence that moderate inflation 
has any effect upon real macro variables, and its impact upon income 
distribution depends upon institutional conditions in an economy. Of course 
very high rates of inflation are undesirable and damaging, for both growth and 
income distribution impacts, and there is a lot of empirical literature to support 
this.
4 However, cross-country evidence now suggests that some inflation has 
                                                  
4 Easterly (2005:31) notes that cross-country time series regressions for developing countries suggest 
that very high inflation and chronically high budget deficits are destructive of growth prospects 
because of the macroeconomic instability they generate, but “it doesn’t follow that one can create 
growth with relative macroeconomic stability.”    31 
negligible impact o n growth possibilities, as relatively “high growth” 
countries such as China and India have shown over the past two decades.  
6.  The negative income distribution effects can be managed by appropriate social 
protection policies to ensure access to basic goods to the poor and to workers, 
or to provide consumption buffers that protect them to some extent from the 
erosion of real income through inflation. Such social protection policies can 
also play an important role as automatic stabilizers in recessions, a point 
which is developed in the next section on managing cycles.  
There are other problems with the strategy of inflation targeting. It does not 
distinguish between cases where there may be inflation inertia (that is, where 
expectations create continuously high inflation rates) and where there may not be, for 
example where the increase in prices is due to some specific factor such as an import 
price shock or an increase in the VAT tax rate.  
Further, inflation targeting does not necessarily generate either internal or external 
balance, much less achieve both simultaneously. If, for example, fiscal policy is 
oriented towards exchange rate targeting (which is now common in many emerging 
market economies), there can be quite severe problems of co-ordination between the 
two. Thus, a devaluation can have expansionary effects upon export production and 
import-substituting production, but only if the central bank does not immediately hike 
interest rates to prevent the devaluation from having inflationary consequences in 
excess of its own target rate of inflation. If there is a shock to exports, it may make 
sense (if one wants to restore quickly both internal and external balance) to take 
actions to directly undo the shock, such as through fiscal policy, rather than tightening 
monetary policy, which can lead to other imbalances. Conversely, focusing on low 
inflation targets may cause the government to become excessively contractionary, 
with implications for exchange rate management as well.  
Indeed, in developing countries it is quite likely that periods of accelerated growth 
will be associated with moderate inflation because supply constraints are encountered. 
In such cases, the focus of policy makers must be  
•  to prevent inflation from becoming excessive by addressing actual and 
potential supply bottlenecks, and correcting sectoral imbalances that may add 
to inflationary pressure, for example in agricultural production;  
•  to ensure the growth process is not adversely affected by policies to control 
inflation; 
•  to counter possible regressive effects of inflation through specific measures 
directed at the poor, such as public provision of certain basic needs; and 
•  to ensure that inflationary expectations are not built up in the system thereby 
causing higher rates of inflation over time.  
An alternative to inflation targeting is a macroeconomic strategy that targets those 
real variables that are important for a particular country (Epstein, 2005). These targets 
need not, indeed should not, be the same over all periods. The standard targets would 
obviously be aggregate economic growth, employment and investment. In addition, 
the targets could relate to adequate livelihood for the people, which would mean 
concern for ensuring the viability of economic activities that sustain most of the 
workforce, such as agriculture and small enterprises in manufacturing and services. 
They could relate to poverty reduction, which would imply concern for increasing the   32 
availability of more productive and higher paid work for less skilled workers, or 
reducing prices of basic needs, such as food, water, health services and basic housing. 
They could be concerned with reducing sectoral or regional imbalances, which could 
involve special packages for sectors or regions that are lagging behind or policies to 
increase inter-sectoral linkages.  
This kind of strategy obviously has direct relevance for the fiscal policies adopted. 
But it also means that monetary policy would have to be different from that envisaged 
in an inflation-targeting paradigm. In particular, the central bank will have to consider 
the use of other instruments, apart from the interest rate, to achieve the various goals, 
and these instruments will have to be used in consonance with the overall fiscal policy 
in terms of level and direction of public expenditure. The basic elements of such an 
alternative strategy are: 
•  Policy makers and the central bank need to identify the set of targets in a 
measurable fashion. Some, such as aggregate growth or investment, are 
relatively easy to measure. Others, such as employment generation or poverty 
reduction, may pose problems in countries where the statistical system is not 
equipped to calculate some variables in a systematic and periodic way. In such 
cases, reliable proxies should be found. For example, if poverty reduction is 
the target but large consumption surveys occur only every five or ten years, 
then those factors directly affecting the poor  – such as agricultural and 
unskilled workers' wages compared to prices of necessities  – could be 
monitored. If productive employment generation is the target, employment in 
small-scale enterprises could be monitored as a proxy for the broader process 
of employment growth.  
•  Monetary policy must be part of the overall macroeconomic policy directed 
towards these targets, rather than operating on a separate track of addressing 
monetary variables only. It should be aligned to and accommodate fiscal and 
exchange rate policies. 
•  Since the chosen target must be met within other constraints, interest rate 
management will not suffice and other instruments must be used by the central 
bank. These can include directed credit and other ways of encouraging banks 
to lend to, say, more employment generating borrowers; guarantees for 
specific kinds of desired investment; some controls on capital flows to reduce 
the possibility of balance of payments problems associated with the strategy; 
creation of specific packages for sectors or regions identified as priority areas.  
•  Policy makers should avoid excessive rigidity over any one target and b e 
prepared to be flexible in adjusting targets and instruments depending upon 
the requirements of changing situations.  
V.  MANAGING ECONOMIC CYCLES 
Economic volatility has become one of the most pressing problems for 
macroeconomic policy in most developing countries. The critical questions for policy 
makers attempting to manage economic cycles from the point of view of both short-
run economic management and longer-term growth strategy are:  
•  how to reduce the tendency to economic cycles originating not only from 
domestic tendencies, but also from international product and capital markets;   33 
•  how to reduce vulnerability to external shocks facing the economy that give 
rise to volatility; 
•  how to improve the economy’s automatic response to such shocks; 
•  how to expand the scope for discretionary responses; 
•  how to design discretionary responses; 
•  how to design “built-in stabilizers” which automatically reduce the adverse 
effects of shocks;  
•  how to manage economic cycles, especially so that downswings can be 
reduced in both severity and duration;  
•  how the worst effects of a crisis and the subsequent adjustment can be 
reduced, with minimal adverse effects upon the poor and low income;  
•  how to help the poor and disadvantaged groups in particular to cope with the 
effects of shock and subsequent adjustment; and 
•  how maximum growth and longer term stability benefits can be derived from 
booms which are anticipated to be relatively short-lived. 
The management of economic cycles has been a standard goal of macroeconomic 
policy since the Keynesian revolution, when it became accepted that the government's 
fiscal and monetary stances could reduce the length and intensity of slumps in 
particular. For a long time, it was assumed that countercyclical policies predominantly 
related to managing slumps and crises of different dimensions. This was because of 
the potential adverse impact of shocks, whether they were external, such as terms of 
trade shocks, exogenous to the economic system, such as harvest failures, or related to 
the impact of policy interventions. The management of these shocks to prevent or 
reduce the severity of a downturn, or measures to bring the economy out of a trough, 
were the most important forms of managing economic cycles. In the recent past, 
however, other issues relating to cyclical patterns have emerged, for example, how to 
benefit in the medium term from temporary externally generated booms, such as 
sudden improvements in the terms of trade.  
Keynesian demand management remains an important approach to deal with 
economic cycles. But such demand management is often inadequate in reducing 
economic volatility or preventing crises for small low income economies in particular, 
because of the deep-seated structural reasons for such volatility, associated with 
various supply bottlenecks, the dominance of low productivity activities and the 
nature of international trade in major items of export and import.  
Most developing countries face both internally and externally generated economic 
volatility. Internal cycles can come from collapses in output, such as crop failures in 
small economies with heavy reliance on some important agricultural commodities, or 
manufacturing cycles related to sectoral imbalances or policy interventions. External 
volatility emanates from the greater vulnerability of emerging markets to financial 
crises, or the impact of sudden negative terms of trade shocks in small open 
developing economies. The distinction between the two types of cycles is increasingly 
hard to draw as they tend to merge given the greater mobility of capital. Thus, capital 
flight can result from exogenous factors, such as changes in interest rates in the 
United States or problems in a neighbouring country causing “contagion” in financial 
markets, but also from changes in domestic policies, processes or even politics.    34 
So how do developing country policy makers in a world of highly mobile capital and 
open trade accounts engage in counter-cyclical policies to avoid or mitigate 
depressions and slumps?  
 
Domestically, the basic instruments remain the same, but they now have to be 
combined with measures to regulate or minimise capital flight. This means that some 
form of capital controls may be indispensable to enable governments to engage in 
strategies to counter slumps. They need not, indeed should not, be heavy handed 
administrative controls: a range of market-based and non-market measures are 
available to developing countries, to be used flexibly and judiciously in combination 
with domestic macroeconomic policies. Thus, market-based measures such as reserve 
requirements for portfolio inflows can be combined with fiscal measures such as 
differential tax rates for different kinds of capital income and administrative measures 
Box 6   
Changes in the nature of economic cycles in developing countries 
Historically, many small developing countries faced problems of growth instability due to 
their dependence on agriculture and a few commodities as major sources of foreign exchange 
earnings. In recent times, these problems have b een compounded because many of the 
economic policies urged upon them are in fact pro-cyclical or tend to encourage greater 
volatility. Macroeconomic policies conventionally associated with dampening cycles 
increasingly worked in the opposite way; other policies such as those associated with 
tightening prudential norms in financial systems also act pro-cyclically. In these situations, 
even in open developing economies, it was still possible to devise counter-cyclical 
macroeconomic policies to reduce or minimise the adverse effects of slumps. However, open 
capital accounts and new forms of capital mobility significantly constrain such possibilities 
for most developing countries, even those with relatively small volumes of capital inflows. 
Policies of trade and financial openness have been associated with scenarios in which 
macroeconomic policies have acted in a pro-cyclical fashion. The effects of external shocks 
are magnified or downswings are sharper because fiscal and monetary policies do not respond 
with expansion but further contraction. A major reason for this is the perceived need to 
maintain or revive “investor confidence”. This leads to policy responses such as raising 
interest rates or maintaining a very high rate, or cutting public expenditure to reduce the fiscal 
deficit, during periods of financial crisis, asset deflation and domestic downswing. Instead, in 
such circumstances, the effective counter-cyclical measures would be the opposite: reduce 
interest rates and increase public expenditure.  
In addition, various other economic policy measures or regimes have pro-cyclical properties. 
For example, rigid prudential norms, such as capital adequacy ratios that impede the ability of 
banks to lend more when their own capital is reduced, essentially stem credit flow during 
economic slumps, aggravating the slump. Similarly, public guarantees on private investment, 
such as governments underwriting risks or guaranteeing rates of return on private investment 
in what are now known as “public -private partnerships”, tend to encourage more profligate or 
over-ambitious private behaviour during a boom, and even more reticent private behaviour 
during a slump than would otherwise have occurred. Since pro-cyclicality adversely affects 
long run growth, these issues cannot be ignored by economic strategists.  
Further, economic volatility has much worse effects on the poor, who typically do not benefit 
so much from booms but bear the brunt of the downswing and subsequent adjustment. Many 
studies show that workers have to face unemployment and/or take wage cuts in periods of 
downswing. Also, in most developing countries, credit and insurance markets usually do not 
work in ways that would allow the bulk of households to reduce the adverse effect of the “bad 
times” by smoothening consumption over time in the face of fluctuating income.   35 
such as minimum lock-in periods for capital. These need not be “permanent” but 
should be flexibly used in changing situations.  
There are several ways of trying to achieve the goals listed above in terms of 
managing cycles, and many have been tried in the developing world recently.  
“Automatic stabilizers” 
While fiscal and monetary policies remain the basic levers to ensure changes in 
aggregate economic activity over the course of a cycle, there are other measures that 
can be quite effective. In particular there are some “automatic stabilizers” that 
developing countries can and should use, such as: 
•  Progressive taxation, which reduces the negative fiscal impact on the poor. (It 
should be noted that some economic reforms that move away from 
progressive tax systems, including moving to a VAT system, can weaken such 
an automatic stabilizer.) 
•  Welfare programmes and social protection policies, including unemployment 
insurance schemes, worker protection, special access to non-collateral based 
credit, public distribution systems for food and other necessities, income 
support for female-headed worker households, and so on. All these operate to 
ensure that consumption does not fall as much as it otherwise would during a 
downswing.   
•  Automatic adjustments of tariffs to external prices, such as the variable tariff 
scheme discussed above in Section III.  
•  Pension plans that do not involve defined contribution, since such 
programmes may lead to more volatility in consumption in response to a 
shock to the stock markets. 
Discretionary stabilizers 
In addition to automatic stabilizers that are particularly important in times of 
downswing, there are ways of responding to booms that could dampen cyclical 
processes. Some of these include: 
•  A counter-cyclical tax such as an export tax that allows the government to 
generate more revenue during periods of an export boom, to be set aside for a 
price stabilisation fund for future exports.  
•  A tax on capital inflows, limited to, say, equity and portfolio capital as 
opposed to “green field” investment, in periods when such inflows are high. 
•  In situations of clear overheating and build-up of speculative bubbles, 
restricting activities that are likely to be associated with boom/bust, e.g. 
speculative real estate, through measures such as imposition of higher capital 
gains taxes and bank regulations that restrict the extent of lending to the real 
estate sector.    36 
VI.  EXCHANGE RATE POLICIES  
IN OPEN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 
Managing exchange rates to ensure growth and stability has become one of the most 
significant requirements of macroeconomic policy. This is especially so after trade 
liberalisation reduced the ability of governments to manage the balance of payments 
by other means and to ensure that higher levels of the exchange rate are not associated 
with lower levels of activity and employment. With trade liberalisation, even prior to 
the liberalisation of capital flows, a significantly overvalued domestic currency is 
likely to generate unemployment, and an undervalued one, to generate inflation.  
The problem is how to achieve a desirable value of the exchange rate, to encourage 
investment in tradeables yet provide price stability, and to avoid sharp destabilising 
changes. Developing countries have been through a gamut of strategies, from strongly 
fixed exchange rate systems to completely flexible “floating” regimes. Both extremes 
have shown their disadvantages. Fixed exchange rate regimes are too rigid and delay 
eventually necessary movements of the exchange rate, which then become subject to 
very sharp shifts with associated crises. Completely flexible rates are usually too 
volatile and can depress longer-term investment because of the considerable 
uncertainty thereby generated.  
In general, exchange rates are managed directly or indirectly by governments, and not 
left solely to the determination of market forces. For developing countries, 
intermediate regimes, such as managed floats or crawling pegs, work best. They allow 
governments to adjust the level of the exchange rate to external conditions as well as 
to the current policy priorities for the domestic economy. These managed floats are 
best maintained through a combination of capital account and banking policy 
measures, along with the more usual open market operations of the central bank 
purchasing or selling currency in the foreign exchange market. 
The argument for keeping the exchange rate low is usually presented in terms of 
promoting the export sectors. This is not only for purely trade reasons, but also 
because it is felt that the traded goods sectors thereby encouraged are more dynamic 
compared to non-traded sectors, and that the higher rates of technical progress will 
spill over to other sectors. Thus, it is argued that the expansion of traded goods sectors 
is more likely to enhance growth than, say, the expansion of the construction sector. A 
second argument focuses on poverty. A high level of the exchange rate could lead to 
lower domestic prices for sectors such as agriculture, which in turn would adversely 
affect peasant cultivators. In countries where peasant cultivators form an important 
segment of the population and economy, this would directly affect rural poverty. In 
such cases, the government may prefer to maintain a low exchange rate and combine 
it with some export taxes: external balance can then be achieved along with protecting 
agriculturalists and generating revenues for development expenditures.  
However, all these possibilities are available mainly when there is some possibility of 
containing very volatile flows of mobile capital. When capital flows are liberalised, 
exchange rates become exceedingly difficult to manage. This can lead to unintended 
and undesirable processes and outcomes.  
For example, the evidence on capital inflows and subsequent crises suggests that once 
an emerging market is “chosen” by financial markets as an attractive destination, 
processes are set in motion which are likely to eventually culminate in crisis. This 
works through the effects of a surge of capital inflows on exchange rates in the   37 
following way. An appreciating real exchange rate encourages investment in non-
tradeable sectors, the most obvious being real estate, and in domestic asset markets 
generally. At the same time, this upward movement of the currency discourages 
investment in tradeables and therefore contributes to a process of relative decline in 
real economic sectors, and even deindustrialisation in developing countries. Given the 
interest rate differentials between domestic and international markets and the lack of 
prudence on the part of international lenders and investors, local agents borrow 
heavily abroad to directly or indirectly invest in the property and stock markets.  
It is important to remember that high real rates of interest tend to be associated with 
appreciating exchange rates, which in turn has the negative consequences already 
described. The two conditions – high interest rate and high exchange rate – therefore 
go together, with adverse effects on investment and the level of economic activity. 
One important conclusion is that, as far as possible, exchange rates in open 
developing countries still need to be “managed”, preferably within a band, along the 
lines of a crawling peg which can adjust to changing internal and external economic 
circumstances. A related conclusion is that capital flows need to be “managed”, in 
terms of both inflows and outflows, to prevent excessive volatility and possible crisis.    38 
Without these in place, the likelihood is that attempts to keep fiscal and external 
deficits within “prudent” limits and not allow the exchange rate to appreciate will 
mean simply saving the resource inflows rather than using them for increased 
investment or consumption in the economy.  
In fact, that is precisely what is happening in much of the developing world at the 
moment. In most developing countries, the recent increase in net savings has not 
come from higher household or private cor porate savings, but from reduced deficits 
or larger surpluses of the public sector, mainly due to public spending cuts. This is 
deflationary on the part of developing country governments, and suppresses domestic 
consumption and investment, with obvious effects on current levels of economic 
activity and employment. But it also negatively affects future growth prospects 
because of the long-term potential losses of inadequate infrastructure investment, etc.  
Capital account convertibility accompanied by domestic prudential regulation cannot 
guard against such boom-bust volatility in capital markets. With completely unbridled 
capital flows, it is no longer possible for a country to control the amount of capital 
inflow or outflow, and both movements can create hugely undesirable consequences. 
Financial liberalisation and the behaviour of fluid finance have therefore created a 
problem analogous to the old “Dutch disease”, with capital inflows causing an 
Box 7   
Exchange rate appreciation and emerging market “crises” 
It is no accident that emerging market economies that have experienced substantial financial 
capital inflows simultaneously experienced property, real estate and stock market booms, 
even as the real economy may have been stagnating or even declining. These booms 
generated the incomes to keep domestic d emand and growth in certain sectors growing at 
relatively high rates. This often created a dualism of rapid income expansion in some sectors 
and stagnation or decline of many productive activities and aggregate employment. Sooner or 
later, this resulted in signs of macroeconomic imbalance, not necessarily in the form of rising 
fiscal deficits of the government, but as a current account deficit reflecting the consequences 
of debt-financed private profligacy. In the light of recent experience, these booms based on 
capital inflows can even be described as “pre-crisis” booms, as occurred in Mexico before the 
“tequila crisis”, Turkey, Russia, Argentina at various points in the 1990s, and the East and 
Southeast Asian economies that experienced financial crisis in the late 1990s. 
It has been suggested that many emerging economies faced these problems because they 
allowed their current account deficits to become too large, reflecting too great an excess of 
private domestic investment over private savings. This is a change from the earlier obsession 
with government fiscal deficits as the main macroeconomic imbalance worth caring about. 
But it still misses the basic point. This is that, with completely unbridled capital flows, it is no 
longer possible for a country to control the amount of capital inflow or outflow, and both 
movements can create undesirable consequences, especially upon the level of the exchange 
rate, which in turn can shift domestic incentives in undesired ways.  
If, for example, a country is chosen as a preferred site for foreign portfolio investment, it can 
lead to huge inflows, causing the currency to appreciate, thus encouraging investment in non-
tradeables rather than tradeables, and altering domestic relative prices and therefore 
incentives. Simultaneously, unless the capital inflows are simply (and wastefully) stored as 
accumulated foreign exchange reserves, they must necessarily be associated with current 
account deficits. This is true even of small countries that receive relatively little in the form of 
foreign private capital inflows, as even small inflows or outflows affect market-determined 
exchange rates at the margin. Thus, “sound” economic policies are themselves undermined by 
the pattern of capital flows which cannot be determined by domestic policy makers.   39 
appreciation of the real exchange rate, in turn resulting in changes in the real 
economy, all within a process that is inherently unsustainable over time.  
However, capital inflows  – whether of foreign aid or private investors  – are not 
necessarily macroeconomically adverse. Such inflows can obviously fill one or more 
of the development “gaps” and can contribute to reducing the savings gap by 
providing investible resources. If they are effectively utilised as productive 
investment that operates to increase both demand and supply, they lead to more 
growth and employment generation. If they enhance productivity conditions, this can 
encourage more exports or import-substituting domestic production, reducing the 
foreign exchange gap.  
Some controls on external flows of capital and goods will help in achieving these 
desirable outcomes faster and in a sustainable way. Co-ordinated macroeconomic 
policies can prevent the “Dutch disease” consequences of unfettered capital account 
liberalisation and allow foreign capital inflows to be effectively utilised for the 
purposes for which they are intended.  
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VII.  ANNEX 
Should the central bank be “independent”?  
Central bank “independence” is sometimes believed to be an essential economic 
reform, but what does it mean? 
The argument for central bank “independence” depends upon the following three 
monetarist postulates: 
•  Real growth is determined by the available supply of factors of production 
such as capital and labour, and the rate of productivity growth; changes in 
monetary variables do not have any impact on real economic activity and 
output growth.  
•  Money supply is exogenous to the system and can be controlled by the 
monetary authorities pursuing well defined targets for monetary growth.  
•  Inflation is due to an excessive growth of money supply relative to an 
exogenously given “real rate of growth of output” and can be moderated by 
reducing the rate of growth of money supply. 
These postulates lead to arguments for an “independent” central bank whose essential 
job would be to control inflation by using money market levers to control money 
supply and therefore the price line. This is usually referred to as “independence” from 
the political process, and therefore from the government. Paradoxically, this is an 
“independence” conferred by the government, as when the government of Britain 
passed legislation to give such “independence” to the Bank of England. 
We have already indicated that the first proposition is not valid in the short term or 
even in the medium term, since interest rates affect investment as well as 
consumption. We have also shown that aggregate money supply cannot be controlled 
by the monetary authorities; rather, the interest rate is the real policy variable. 
Similarly, inflation reflects the excess of expenditure over output, and the associated 
increase in money supply is part of  the same process. So it is the excess of 
expenditure over output that needs to be managed, rather than the money supply. So 
the postulates which are used to argue for central bank independence are themselves 
flawed.  
Central banks do need some degree of insulation from the day-to-day ebb and flow of 
politics and should be able to focus on medium term objectives of the economy and 
society. However, the “independence” intended by the drive for “central bank 
independence” is to have central banks focus almost  exclusively on one aspect of 
economic policy – the control of inflation and price stability. 
Such a single-minded focus may not just ignore, but even be detrimental to, other 
objectives so crucial to developing countries, such as growth and employment 
generation, since the central bank will tend to have a deflationary bias. Under such an 
understanding of “independence”, central bankers can ignore pressures to relax 
monetary policy, even to the point of sacrificing economic activity and employment. 
In effect, it means removing monetary policy from any political and democratic 
accountability.  
Nor does such “independence” mean that the central bank therefore becomes 
apolitical. Rather, such “independence” represents, wittingly or unwittingly, a   41 
political choice by policy makers: some interests, e.g. rentiers, are elevated over 
others, such as unemployed or underemployed workers, or small scale industrialists 
and agriculturalists, who would be interested in a higher level of economic activity.  
The motivation for such a measure in many developing countries is the desire to 
attract international investors who want some signal that the government is serious 
about inflation control, or so it is perceived. However, there is really no trade-off 
between giving up control of monetary policy and attracting capital inflows. Instead, 
since such a strategy usually means higher real interest rates, whatever the 
requirements of the domestic economy, it tends to depress domestic economic 
activity. Furthermore, such central bank “independence” constrains fiscal policy as 
well, limiting the government's recourse to deficit financing by raising the cost of 
government borrowing, inadvertently putting the economy on a deflationary course 
even when that is not desirable. While there is no necessary relation between central 
bank independence, capital inflows and domestic economic growth, the first is 
generally associated with lower rates of economic activity, investment and therefore 
future growth, than would otherwise have been the case. Low or stable inflation is 
certainly one of the factors that can promote a healthy “investment climate” in a  
country, but there are several other factors that are also important. And if the low 
inflation results from very tight monetary policy that restricts investment, then the net 
impact upon investment will not be positive.  
In summary, central bank independence focussed primarily on inflation control can be 
adverse to promoting the growth prospects of the economy. Instead, monetary policy 
should accommodate fiscal policy, which itself should be directed towards expanding 
growth, employment and better human development. Rather than “independence”, the 
central bank should be an arm of government, its activities forming part of a co-
ordinated macroeconomic strategy.  
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